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Interest Groups and the Media In Post-Cold War 
U.S. Foreign Polley 
James M. McCormick 
How successful are interest groups in shaping American foreign policy? 
How successful are the media in affecting foreign affairs? During the 
cold war, the usual answer to both questions was "not much." With 
the exception of some ethnic and economic groups under speciiic cir-
cumstances, most analysts would conclude that interest groups did not 
fare very well, and the media largely played a supportive role to official 
policy, at least until the Vietnam War.1 With the end of the cold war, 
however, are the answers to these questions likely to be the same? 
In this chapter, I discuss the access, involvement, and influence of 
these two nongovernmental actors in the foreign policy process after 
the cold war. In particular, I focus upon how and why the role of interest 
groups and the media in foreign policy have changed in recent years. In 
doing so, I shall explore several domestic and international factors that 
have increased interest group and media access to the foreign policy 
decision-making machinery, discuss how new and differing interest 
groups and media flourish in this changed environment, and analyze 
how more and more foreign policy decisions have moved away from the 
crisis to the structural and strategic varieties, a change that enhances 
the impact of interest groups and the media on the foreign policy pro-
cess? Finally, and as others have done before, I take up the more difficult 
issue of relative influence of these actors in this new environment. 
Factors Limit ing the Role of Interest Groups and 
the Media during the Cold War 
The usual reason for arguing that interest groups had limited impact on 
foreign policy during the cold war turned on several structural and pro-
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cess argurnents.3 First of all, American foreign policy was more likely 
to be initiated by the president than by Congress. As such, interest 
groups had much greater difficulty gaining access to the former than 
to the latter, since Congress had numerous committees and subcom-
mittees that were accessible. Although Bernard Cohen points out that 
interest groups sought to influence the bureaucracies at the executive 
level, their efforts yielded limited results and may have aided the inter-
ests of the bureaucracies more than the interests of the lobbyists.• Sec-
ond, foreign policy issues and decisions were usually quite remote from 
the lives of Americans, and rallying support or opposition by interest 
groups posed a significant challenge.5 Third, crucial foreign policy de-
cisions were likely to be crisis decisions-characterized by short deci-
sion time, high threat, and surprise. For such situations, foreign policy 
making was more likely to be centered in a small group in the execu-
tive branch, allowing little, if any, congressional participation. In short, 
interest group influence was further curtailed during these important 
decision-making periods. Fourth, with the number of interest groups 
operating in the policy arena, opposing groups would likely arise over 
any divisive issue, weakening the impact of any one interest group or 
a set of coalitional interest groups. In such a competitive environment, 
policy makers actually gained more latitude for dealing with competing 
pressures from one group or another.6 
During the cold war, the media exercised limited influence because 
of self-imposed constraints and the nature of the foreign policy process 
itself. The media tended to be deferential to governmental officials and 
governmental policies, as one analysis noted: "The press was often a 
sideline player and occasional cheerleader in the policy process simply 
because the process, itself, was anything but open to public view." 7 
Thus, the members of the media more often seemed to elicit support 
for official policies from the public than to challenge them. In an envi-
ronment that offered the prism of the cold war for interpreting global 
events, the media were less likely to advance new policy options them-
selves or from others. Put somewhat differently, "The press was often 
critical but of the execution of policy more than the aims.''8 Finally, and 
as with interest groups generally, the media operated in a conflict-prone 
and crisis-prone environment during the cold war, further muting its 
criticisms of policies and options. 
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Factors Facilitating the Role of Interest Groups and 
the Media after the Cold War 
Since the end of the Vietnam War and cold war, however, some ana-
lysts have suggested that access by interest groups and the media in 
the foreign policy process is no longer what it was. Tierney and Us-
laner, among others, imply that earlier assessments about foreign policy 
interest groups may be somewhat timebound, pointing to several new 
domestic and international factors.9 Likewise, Bennett dates the rise 
of greater media access to the process as coming "after the late 1960s 
(late Vietnam War)"; he also argues that the media's greater role "in the 
crumbling elite consensus" within the country began about that same 
time.10 As issues became more contentious at home among competing 
elites (e.g., between the White House and the Congress), the media also 
became more involved and offered more criticism of official policy to 
the public at large. In short, after the cold war-and with the dramatic 
changes in global politics that James Scott and A. Lane Crothers discuss 
in the opening essay of this volume-media access and involvement in-
creased proportionately. 
Global Factors and Increased Interest Group/Media Access 
The end of the cold war-vividly dramatized by the opening of the Ber-
lin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe, and the implosion of the Soviet Union-shook the foun-
dation of American foreign policy. With the communist threat no longer 
serving as such an important unifying force for American foreign policy 
making, new issues-economic, environmental, and social-cultural-
are now on the agenda. More often than not, these issues divide, rather 
than unite, the American public and policy makers. Trade issues, like 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) divided the Demo-
crats in Congress from President Clinton in 1993, while environmen-
tal issues have fissured both political parties. The trade-offs between 
trade and human rights considerations, as in the case of most-favored-
nation (MFN) status for China, have divided Democrats and Republicans, 
liberals and conservatives, and even various regions of the country. 
Furthermore, even as some security issues remain on the agenda (or as 
some new ones gain a place there), they, too, are more likely to divide 
than to unify. As the controversy surrounding the expansion of NATO or 
American action in Bosnia demonstrates, no American position toward 
these questions is self-evident or widely supported, as might have oc-
curred during the cold war years. Americans of Central European back-
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ground may clamor for more rapid expansion of NATO, but political 
elites worried about the future of Russia may not. Contrast, too, the ar-
ray of domestic positions toward Russia, the former Soviet republics, 
or toward Bosnia with the rather singular American response to the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary during the height of the cold war or toward 
Castro's Cuba in the 196os. 
This new global policy environment and its issues have important 
implications for enhancing interest groups and media access to the for-
eign policy process. Because these issues increasingly tend to be divi-
sive domestically and because no unified American position is readily 
obvious on many of them, they offer immediate opportunities for inter-
est group involvement in the foreign policy process. Indeed, they invite 
interest groups to mobilize and to attempt to influence policy in the 
executive and legislative branches to a much greater degree than was 
possible during the cold war. The media similarly benefit from this en-
vironment, since these policy controversies within official Washington 
are grist for their reporting. Additionally, as more actors are increas-
ingly involved in the foreign policy process, and as policy making has 
become a more disjointed and untidy process than during the cold war, 
the media may seek out various political actors-even as those partici-
pants in turn seek out the media to get their message out. In short, the 
media now can play a more significant role in setting the agenda or in 
exacerbating the debate over foreign policy issues. 
Domestic Factors and Increased Interest Group/Media Access 
In the domestic arena, at least two important changes have occurred 
that enhance interest group and media access and involvement on for-
eign policy issues: one has occurred within the congressional constella-
tion of factors; the other within the society at large. 
Congressional Change and Interest Groups. Due to internal reforms 
dating back to the end of the Vietnam War (see chapter 5), foreign pol-
icy interest groups now have greater access to Congress. First, con-
gressional committees now share more jurisdiction on foreign policy 
matters. By one estimate, some sixteen committees in the House and 
the Senate have at least some responsibilities over foreign and defense 
policy issues.11 In addition to the increase in jurisdictional decisions 
made by Congress, multiple referrals on legislation by the congressional 
leadership also have led to this greater dispersal of responsibilities. More 
committees and subcommittees now consider aspects of foreign policy 
legislation. To be sure, with the Republicans in control of the Congress 
since 1995 and some efforts being made to pare back the size of sub-
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committees and committees, joint referrals have ended (although not 
sequential or split referrals), but dispersal of foreign policy responsibili-
ties within Congress remains.12 
These internal changes are perhaps best manifested in the two princi-
pal foreign policy committees in the Congress, the House International 
Relations (formerly Foreign Affairs) Committee and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Both committees have held more and more hear-
ings on both legislative and oversight matters in recent decades. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the House International Relations Committee (then 
Foreign Affairs) held about 300 hearings during a particular Congress. 
Near the end of the Vietnam War, during the 93rd Congress (1973-74), 
the committee held 295 committee and subcommittee hearings. By the 
97th Congress (1981-82.), however, the number of hearings had grown 
dramatically, totally 702. during those years. During the 104th Con-
gress (1995-96), the number had fallen back to 452, but the intervening 
Congresses had all been over 6oo hearings per year.13 By contrast, the 
number of hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is 
smaller, but that committee, too, has increased its use of hearings and 
special committees and subcommittees to investigate particular con-
cerns.14 This kind of committee activism has important implications for 
interest groups in that it offers more and more avenues of access to the 
foreign policy process. 
Second, congressional staff dealing with foreign policy have in-
creased. For instance, the staff for the House International Relations 
Committee in 1971 totaled eleven; in 1991, eighty-five; and in 1996, 
si.xty-five.15 For the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the important 
change was in the decision to provide the subcommittees with some 
staff of their own (previously the committee staff served the subcom-
mittees as well) and to enlarge the number of aides from twenty-five in 
1979 to sixty-seven in 1991 (although the staff size declined to forty-six 
by 1996).16 Both of these changes in the House and the Senate have en-
abled more points of contact for interest groups, especially since efforts 
to influence the committees are more frequently directed toward staff 
than toward the members themselves. While the recent cutbacks in 
congressional staff militate against interest group activity, staff size re-
mains reasonably large by historical standards, facilitating sustained 
interest group activity. 
Third, the operation of the armed services committees have changed. 
Both the House National Security (formerly the Armed Services) Com-
mittee and the Senate Armed Services Committee are now involved not 
only in authorizing the defense budget, but also in devising strategies 
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for the post-cold war era. As Paul Stockton has noted, "[L]egislators 
are no longer satisfied to focus on budgetary details and ignore more 
fundamental issues." 17 To be sure, this judgment does not mean that 
members of Congress have abandoned efforts at "micromanaging" the 
defense budget. Instead, it means that now, without an overarching 
American strategy toward the world, Congress has joined the executive 
in thinking about the structure of forces and strategic goals for the U.S. 
military. Paul Stockton has nicely summarized this new environment: 
"[I]ncentives for members to strategize now exist side by side with in-
centives for rnicromanagement." 18 
As a result, interest groups have more access and potential impact 
than before. While micromanagement of the defense budget tradi-
tionally meant protecting favorite pork-barrel programs back home-
the substance of interest group politics-strategizing also aids interest 
group activity, inviting even more groups into the process. Because con-
gressional staffs will not likely have the time or inclination to devise 
wholly new grand strategies, congressional offices and committees will 
become receptive to the work of think tanks or other outside lobbying 
groups. Stockton once again goes to the heart of the matter: "Strategy 
is the province of think tanks and-perhaps-the Pentagon." 19 Further-
more, the use of annual authorizations as opposed to open-ended au-
thorizations facilitate strategizing and micromanagemen(10-ensuring 
an ongoing role for interest groups. 
Finally, and beyond the internal change within the Congress, con-
gressional campaigns and interest groups have been more intertwined 
in the post-cold war era. Through the use of "soft money" to political 
parties and through "independent" campaigns by interested groups (e.g., 
the large number of campaign ads by the AFL-CIO in the 1996 election), 
interest groups are more and more a fixture of congressional life. While 
the post-cold war milieu may have accelerated the involvement, inter-
est groups and congressional campaigns have long been intertwined. 
Congressional Change and the Media. Much as the congressional 
changes facilitate interest group activity, these changes also enhance 
the media. Indeed, the process is a synergistic one between the media 
and Congress. As the congressional process becomes a more open one, 
the media have greater access to the committee process and enhance 
their ability to report the partisan and ideological conflicts that may 
result; as the media become an increasingly standard feature of congres-
sional process, members increasingly seek to use such outlets to shape 
their message to their colleagues and to the public at large. 
The end of the cold war did not begin the process of the media's 
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role; instead, it has expanded considerably from the Vietnam War to the 
present. Beginning with the televised hearings on the Vietnam War in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the mid-196os, the role of 
television coverage, for example, has expanded dramatically. Fixst, tele-
vision coverage of the House and the Senate began. Next, C-Span, the 
cable network, offered "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of all House and Senate 
sessions as well as many committee hearings on legislation, nomina-
tions, and investigations. In turn, the House and Senate press galleries 
offered almost instantaneous venues for congressional reactions to for-
eign events and to White House announcements. As President Clin-
ton was announcing his foreign policy team for his second term in 
December 1996, for instance, members of the Senate appeared within 
minutes in the gallery to offer theix evaluation of the new personnel. 
Earlier, after President Clinton announced that Secretary of State War-
ren Christopher would not continue in a second term, Senator Richard 
Lugar (R-Ind.) held a press briefing to outline the criteria for a new 
secretary and the foreign policy issues that the United States needs to 
address in the years ahead?1 Added to this television coverage, other 
electronic (i.e., radio and now the internet) and print media have con-
tinued their coverage of both ends of Capitol Hill. 
The other side of this synergistic relationship is the effort that mem-
bers make to use the media for their own ends. Increasingly, members 
of Congress are "media entrepreneurs," who take advantage of the ex-
panded number of media outlets and the increased coverage of the Con-
gress to influence the public policy debate, including foreign policy.n 
Members may use a variety of techniques to obtain media coverage 
both inside and outside the institution. Within the institution, and in 
addition to regular floor and committee debate, House members may 
use "one-minute" speeches to attract attention to an issue, while Senate 
members may use the "morning business" period for the same purpose. 
Sixnilarly, and as suggested above, members may hold news conferences 
on foreign (and domestic) policy issues. The possible advantages of these 
institutional measures are that they may be picked up by the national 
networks and their ixnpact is magnified. As a result, members engage in 
conscious efforts to produce short, pithy statements that may capture 
the media's attention.23 
Members also seek to use the media to influence policy to a wider 
audience and to enhance their reputation as policy experts. By writ-
ing op-ed pieces for national newspapers (e.g., the Washington Post, the 
New York Times, or the Wall Street Journal), or issuing press releases, 
members may gain attention and be invited on daily television inter-
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view programs, such as the The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, or on the 
Sunday morning interview programs, such as Meet the Press, Face the 
Nation, or This Week. In these ways, the members gain national ex-
posure and begin to influence or even shape the debate. Such actions, 
as Karen Kedrowski reminds us, go beyond simply reaching their own 
constituents and are particularly important at the agenda stage in deal-
ing with an issue.14 
Societal Change and Interest Groups. The second significant domes-
tic change to assist interest groups in the foreign policy realm is the 
change in American society and politics at large. The political process 
within the United States has perceptibly moved toward greater parti-
san and ideological divisions. Divisions exist on foreign policy issues 
(as they probably always have),25 but they have become more intensi-
fied in the current period without the dampening effect of the cold 
war environment.26 As a result, as partisan and ideological divisions 
have become more pronounced, opportunities for interest groups are 
enhanced-and even magnified-on some foreign policy issues. 
Prominent foreign policy controversies from the 198os to the early 
1990s accentuate the new role of interest groups in the foreign policy 
process over partisan and ideological issues. Aid to the Nicaraguan con-
tras in the 198os elicited a great deal of controversy along partisan and 
ideological lines and a great deal of interest group activity. Two ob-
servers of interest group activity on this issue reported this new inten-
sity: "What distinguished the groups in the Nicaraguan case ... was 
the scale, duration, and intensity of their activity. For a period of more 
than seven years, between 1982 and 1989 and peaking in 1985-86, over 
two hundred organizations became involved in efforts to influence con-
gressional votes on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua."17 Once again, these 
organizations ranged from groups that were formed to support or op-
pose this singular issue only to more general conservative and liberal 
political groups that decided to lobby on this particular policy question. 
Interest group activity over a sanctions bill toward Saddam Hussein's 
Iraq (after the leadership of that country had brutally used chemical 
weapons on its Kurdish population in March 1988) illustrates this pat-
tern as well. In the words of one congressional aide, the lobbying "was 
obscene."28 A principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-
R.!.), apparently agreed with this assessment, albeit in more under-
stated language: "All the special interests got into the act."19 Despite 
the fact that a tough, wide-ranging economic sanctions bill was intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate with bipartisan support and was approved by 
the full Senate only one day after its introduction/ 0 opposition quickly 
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emerged. It came from the Reagan administration and several promi-
nent interest groups. The lobbying effort included those agricultural 
interests that saw Iraq as "a large and growing market for U.S. agri-
cultural exports," oil companies that were increasingly importing Iraqi 
oil into the United States, and defense contractors and large industrial 
countries with trading interests in Iraq. Further, the U.S.-Iraq Business 
Forum, a group of American companies with business interests in Iraq 
and with informal links to the Iraqi embassy in Washington, pressured 
for the defeat of this kind of economic sanctions bill. As a result, alter-
nate bills and watered-down bills were subsequently introduced, and 
the original measure failed to become law. 
At the end of the cold war, trade issues, such as the NAFTA and 
GATT agreements, have accelerated interest group activity as well. The 
groups involved on this issue range from the traditional economic inter-
est groups to environmental, consumer, and single-issue or political 
organizations, such as Empower America and Americans for Demo-
cratic Action. While the total number of interest groups involved in the 
NAFTA debate is difficult to estimate with much precision, the array of 
groups was quite substantial, probably numbering in the hundreds. By 
one set of estimates, too, the total spending by interest groups was ex-
traordinary; U.S. interest groups spent some Sio million while Mexican 
interest groups spent s3o to S45 million "on no fewer than twenty-four 
lobbying, public relations and law fums."31 
As more and new kinds of issues arise in the post-cold war era 
(e.g., the question of immigration, U.S. intervention abroad, new trade 
regimes), and activate many different types of interest groups, their role 
becomes an even greater feature of the foreign policy process. Further-
more, as some issues, and particularly issues that require technological 
and scientific knowledge to sift through the debate (e.g., global warming 
or the handling of fissile materials with the dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons), gain a larger place on the agenda, specialized interest groups 
will enjoy even more privileged access to the policy process than in 
the past. 
Societal Change and the Media. These societal changes have also had 
an impact on the media. As partisan and ideological divisions in Ameri-
can society have intensified, more and more controversies have arisen. 
Controversies are the stuff of greater media access and involvement on 
issues, including foreign policy. As controversies widen, the purview of 
the media spreads as well. No longer is media coverage limited to for-
eign policy issues at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State De-
partment (or the "Golden Triangle," as Lance Bennett called it).31 That 
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is, the media now move beyond official statements and Washington 
policy makers in covering foreign policy events. Once again, with con-
troversial issues such as immigration, nuclear proliferation, and trade 
policy crowding the foreign policy agenda, more and more actors have 
a part to play in shaping the direction of foreign policy. These actors, in 
turn, enable the media to have greater access. 
The movement away from the cold war in American society en-
hances the media in yet another way: it enables the media to try to add 
new issues to the foreign policy agenda, sometimes successfully. Con-
sider, for example, the powerful effect of the media in portraying the 
death and starvation in Ethiopia in the mid- 198os and Somalia in the 
early 1990s. When NBC television showed a 1984 report on the Ethiopian 
famine, the effect on American foreign policy was dramatic: "The im-
pact was immediate and overwhelming. The phones started ringing at 
NBC and at the Connecticut headquarters of Save the Children .... The 
next night, NBC aired another BBC report and, again, the response was 
staggering. CBS and ABC a week later aired more reports on the famine-
with even more response, more reports. The story had exploded."33 U.S. 
policy makers took note as well, and they began to shape an American 
response. 
In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, too, the media aided in 
prodding President Bush to address the starving and suffering in Soma-
lia. Media pictures and accounts of the death and suffering resulted in 
part in American military aircraft being used to transport food and, 
eventually, American ground forces being deployed to aid in the distri-
bution of food. In some ways, the media went even further. They met 
the American forces as they came ashore in Somalia, turning it into a 
media event: "Among the most vivid scenes from that operation was the 
look of startled Navy seals in war paint hitting the beaches which had 
already been secured by television news crews to record the landing." 34 
The ability of the media to place new issues on the agenda and to 
shape American foreign policy should not be exaggerated, as some re-
cent analysts suggest. The so-called "cNN effect" may not be quite as 
potent as some imply, even in the Somalia case mentioned above. As 
one careful analysis of this episode reveals, the media "did not indepen-
dently drive Somalia to the surface." Rather they reflected the policy 
goals of those in the Bush administration, the Congress, and the inter-
national community who wanted to enlarge American actions in that 
country.35 Similarly, despite vivid portrayal of the killings and the suffer-
ing in Bosnia, the media hardly propelled that issue to action by foreign 
policy makers in the early 1990s. It was not until the slaughters of July 
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1995 that the Clinton administration finally decided to take decisive ac-
tions to try to resolve the festering issue. The same proved to be the case 
for Rwanda. Although the media dramatically catalogued the slaughters 
in Rwanda in 1994 and the desperation in that country in 1996, Ameri-
can actions were largely delayed by the Clinton administration, in the 
latter instance, until after the presidential election. In short, as another 
analyst contends, the media are much less effective in shaping policy 
and policy makers than a first look might suggest: "The CNN Effect is 
narrower and far more complex than the conventional wisdom holds."36 
New Interest Groups and New Media 
A third element in this changed post-cold war environment is the sheer 
growth of new interest groups and media. Both the new global envi-
ronment and societal changes directly contribute to the expansion of 
interest groups and the media. 
The Rise of New Groups. While one estimate puts the total num-
ber of interest groups at about 12,500/ 7 those with a foreign policy 
focus is surely a fraction of that number. Even so, the number of for-
eign policy interest groups continues to grow. While traditional foreign 
policy groups often mirrored the key domestic groups (i.e., business, 
labor, and agricultural groups with their foreign policy concerns), they 
also included a few prominent ethnic lobbies and some veterans groups. 
Over the past two or three decades, though, several new groups-for-
eign lobbies, some religious lobbies, think tanks, and scattered single-
issue lobbies-have come along and have increasingly exercised some 
foreign policy clout. 
While the Jewish lobby has been, and remains, the most prominent 
ethnic lobby, it, too, has been undergoing some change. With increas-
ing, successful efforts to obtain peace in the Middle East, and with some 
accompanying fissures in Israeli society, some divisions have been de-
tected in the Jewish lobby in the United States, eroding some of its 
impact and allowing the emergence of other ethnic lobbies to garner 
significant attention.38 
Still, ethnic group actions to shape the direction of foreign policy 
have reached "a historic high water mark," in the estimate of one ana-
lyst.39 One significant change is the lobbying effort by American citi-
zens with origins in the old Soviet empire. In 1993, several different 
American ethnic associations (e.g., Armenian Americans, Ukrainian 
Americans, Czech Americans, Slovak Americans, Polish Americans, 
Hungarian Americans, Latvian Americans, and a host of others) joined 
together to form the Central and East European Coalition. Among the 
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goals of this coalition are promoting the expansion of NATO, fostering 
more economic assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe, and re-
ducing the emphasis on Russia in the Clinton administration's policy. 
While ethnic members with these origins are relatively small in number 
(about 9 percent of the American population), they are mainly located 
in some key Midwestern states that could have significant political 
clout in closely contested elections (at either the presidential or con-
gressional level). As a consequence, President Clinton sought to gain 
the support of these ethnic voters by his actions and the Republican 
Congress promoted actions consistent with the wishes of these voters 
as well.40 A separate lobbying effort by one of these groups, the Arme-
nian Assembly, has also proved potent. It has been able to direct eco-
nomic assistance to Armenia and has gained congressional approval for 
banning aid to Azerbaijan, its rival in the region!• 
Two other changes in this area are the growth of congressional cau-
cuses to deal with these concerns and the growth of ethnic-based politi-
cal action committees (PAcs). In 1988, six ethnic congressional caucuses 
existed (e.g., the Hispanic Caucus), while in 1997, fifteen such caucuses 
exist (e.g., the Portuguese American Caucus). In 1988, twenty ethnic 
PACs existed, while that number in 1996 was up to fifty-one.42 Both 
kinds of organizations are mechanisms for ethnic groups to exert more 
influence in the political process. 
Two increasingly influential ethnic lobbies are the Cuban American 
lobby and the African American lobby. The Cuban American National 
Foundation is the most prominent of the Cuban American groups, and 
it has affected the behavior of both political parties in how they ad-
dress the issue of Cuba. While Republican administrations have gener-
ally been more receptive than Democratic ones, the Clinton adminis-
tration stopped appointments to the Department of State, opposed cuts 
in Radio Marti, the U.S. government-run station broadcasting to Cuba, 
and responded promptly to the Cuban attack on two unarmed planes in 
international waters off Cuba. One congressional member, commenting 
on the foundation's power, claimed that the interest group "uses diffi-
cult, difficult tactics whenever you disagree with them."43 
The African American lobby has been quite successful lately as 
well.44 Trans-Africa, its most prominent lobby, was largely responsible 
for initiating a coalition lobbying effort to impose economic sanctions 
on South Africa in the mid-198os. Indeed, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986 could be traced rather directly to its efforts. Equally so, the actions 
of Trans-Africa and its head, Randall Robinson, were pivotal in keep-
ing the Haitian issue on the foreign policy agenda during 1993 and 1994 
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and in pushing for stronger action against the military rulers in 1994. 
A hunger strike by Randall Robinson seemingly had an important im-
pact on U.S. policy makers at the time. As a consequence, this interest 
group and the Congressional Black Caucus seemed to have been pivotal 
in affecting the Clinton administration's decision making over taking 
action on Haiti in the fall of 1994. 
Another important transformation among new interest groups has 
been associated with religious lobbies. While religious lobbies were par-
ticularly prominent on foreign policy issues during the Vietnam War in 
the 1960s and 1970s and over El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the nuclear 
freeze issues in the 198os, these groups have not declined in activism. 
Indeed, the end of the cold war, with such difficult issues as Somalia, 
Haiti, and Bosnia, has actually sparked renewed activity and involve-
ment to infuse a moral and ethical component into American foreign 
policy. In a reversal of positions from earlier decades, some religious 
activists now favor and lobby for greater use of America's intervention 
capabilities to address the underlying social ills. According to Father J. 
Bryan Hehir, a foreign policy adviser to the American Catholic bishops 
and a professor at the Harvard Divinity School, "The nuclear question 
has moved out of the terms of the debate [for religious groups]. What has 
taken its place are questions about the need for intervention because of 
human rights violations or civil wars or ethnic conflicts."~ 
Far and away, the most prominent change in lobbying of the Ameri-
can foreign policy process has been growth and pervasiveness of foreign 
lobbies, interest groups initiated and funded - directly or indirectly-by 
other countries. Table 7.1 catalogs this growth in countries represented 
and number of firms or individuals employed by each country over 
the past two decades. Particular increases have occurred among Eastern 
European and African countries in their lobbying efforts in Washing-
ton, although all regions of the world show growth. Several examples of 
these newest interest groups will convey a better sense of their preva-
lence. 
In recent years, the Japanese lobby effort has received the most at-
tention and publicity/6 but that foreign lobby is only one among many 
foreign lobbies that now occupy the interest group arena in Washing-
ton. The foreign lobbies corning from the republics that used to com-
prise the old Soviet Union are the newest groups in Washington. These 
new nations are rapidly hiring law and public relations firms to advance 
their views in both the executive and legislative branches of the Ameri-
can government. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Latvia, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are some of the countries 
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Table 7.1 Number of Foreign Interest Groups by Region, Represented in 
Washington, 1977, 1986, and 1996 
Region Year 
1977 1986 1996 
Africa 
Total Countries 13 26 33 
Total Representatives 30 46 72 
Asia 
Total Countries 16 18 21 
Total Representatives 80 256 257 
Pacific 
Total Countries 5 3 7 
Total Representatives 23 20 26 
Western Europe 
Total Countries 19 18 21 
Total Representatives ISS 207 254 
Eastern Europe 
Total Countries 10 6 24 
Total Representatives 44 17 92 
Middle East 
Total Countr ies 14 10 18 
Total Representatives 38 57 108 
North America 
Total Countries 23 20 23 
Total Representatives 95 176 210 
South America 
Total Countries 10 7 13 
Total Representatives 43 58 83 
Sources: These totals were calculated from the listings in Directory of Washington 
Representatives of Amencan Associations and Industries (Washington, D.C.: Colum· 
bia Books, 1977); Washington Representatives, Ioth ed. (Washington, D.C. : Columbia 
Books, 1986)1 and Washington Representatives, ~oth ed. (Washington, D.C.: Columbia 
Books, 1996). 
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that now have representatives. Russia, too, has joined these lobbying 
efforts by late I993; indeed, the government of Russia or Russian firms 
had signed agreements with nine different law and consulting fums.4 7 
The People's Republic of China also has established a large contingent 
of representatives to make their case with the American government, 
especially for dealing with the sensitive issue of trade relations between 
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the two nations. Top-flight lawyers and former officials of the American 
government have been employed by U.S. business concerns interested 
in gaining access to Chinese officials, and other lobbyists are promoting 
Chinese businesses within the United States.48 These joint efforts, by 
officials of American business and by representatives of Chinese busi-
ness and government, provide for a persuasive effort to maintain most-
favored-nation (MFN) status for China and for promoting and expanding 
American trade and investment with China. 
Many less familiar and powerful states have hired their own Wash-
ington representatives or sent their own representatives to lobby their 
particular cases. These officials represent countries from virtually every 
corner of the world. For many years, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland, and 
Zaire in Africa have had hired representatives in Washington, while 
a representative for Mauritania was contracted more recently.49 Indo-
nesia and India from Asia have similarly sought representation.50 Haiti, 
Mexico, and Guatemala from the Caribbean and Central America have 
hired lobbyists in recent years as well.51 From the South Pacific, for ex-
ample, New Zealand has considerable direct lobbying occurring by its 
key groups. Members of the New Zealand Dairy Board and the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board, for example, are visitors to Washing-
ton with the Department of Agriculture and the Congress as their im-
portant targets.52 In short, foreign lobbies are now the standard in the 
Washington interest group community. 
Even some unpopular political factions from foreign countries have 
hired firms to represent them in Washington. Sinn Fein, the political 
wing of the Irish Republican Army, and the Ulster Unionist Party have 
joined the parade by hiring representatives in Washington. Likewise, 
the Russian party of Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, the Liberal Democratic 
Party, has sought to bring its nationalist message here as well. The 
National Council of Resistance in Iran, a party labeled as Marxist by 
the U.S. State Department, hired a Washington public affairs firm in a 
us,ooo-a-month contract to convey its views to the Congress. These 
factions join others, such as the Kashmiri American Council, a group 
committed to Kashmir's independence, as a way to counteract govern-
ments in power with representation in the United States.53 
Finally, the recent revelations of foreign campaign contributors to 
President Clinton's 1996 election campaign even more vividly drama-
tize the role of foreign lobbies. Contributions came from, either directly 
or indirectly, the Lippo Group in Indonesia, supporters in Taiwan, a 
consultant with ties to a Thai business conglomerate, a South Korean 
entrepreneur, and perhaps from the Chinese government or its repre-
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sentatives. While some of these funds were returned, and investigations 
are ongoing over the legality of activities, the flow of foreign money 
into the political process totaled in the millions of dollars.5' 
New and Old Media. Several important media changes have occurred 
near the end of the cold war and continue apace in the post-cold war 
period. The growth of the electronic media has been most pronounced 
to the point that those media are more pervasive than the print media. 
The "cNN-ization of the world," referring to the power and influence of 
the Atlanta-based network of the Turner broadcasting system (and now 
owned by Time-Warner), epitomizes this new electronic explosion. Yet, 
the growth goes beyond that station to include the expansion of cable 
stations and cable systems, both nationally and worldwide (e.g., C-Span, 
Fox Broadcasting, MSNB C, the NBC Station in Europe, and Britain's Sky 
Tv) and the proliferation of radio stations.55 The literal explosion in the 
use of the fax machines and the internet, too, has virtually assured in-
stantaneous global communications.56 Through these media outlets, the 
impact of the media on foreign policy is more "immediate, sensational, 
and pervasive." 57 
The first part of table 7.2 provides some sense of the growth in the 
electronic media over the past two decades and the stability in the circu-
lation of the print media. While the number of radio stations has grown 
slowly over the past two decades, the number of television stations, and 
cable systems has doubled or even tripled since the early 1970s. By con-
trast, newspaper circulation has remained markedly stable until about 
1990, and it has experienced a slight decline to this day. 
The impact of such coverage on the foreign policy process and on 
American society generally remains unclear, especially when several 
other different indicators are considered. As the second half of table 7.2 
reveals, the amount of interest in news about other countries and about 
U.S. foreign policy among the American public has remained stable and 
generally low over the last two decades. The percentage of the public 
that is "very interested" in information about other nations remains in 
the rnid-30 percent range, and the percentage "very interested" in U.S. 
relations with other nations averages somewhat higher at 45 to so per-
cent.58 More troubling, although not shown in table 7 .2, viewership of 
nightly broadcasts on the major networks continues to decline to only 
42 percent in 1996 compared to about So percent in the 1970s. Among 
those under thirty, the viewership is even lower at only 22 percent.59 
Furthermore, foreign policy coverage by the news media remains mark-
edly small. Estimates of such coverage range from II to 16 percent for 
all print and network coverage.60 In one study of ten newspapers, more-
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Table 7.1. Changes in the Media Outlets and Interest in Foreign News, 1974-1994 
Year 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 
Newspaper circulations 62 mil. 62 mil. 62.5 mil. 62.5 mil. 62.3 mil. 60mil. 
Number of raclio stations 4361 4316 4668 4863 4987 4913 
Number of television 694 720 1065 1235 1442 1512 
stations 
Number of cable systems 3158 3875 4825 7600 9575 11,230 
Percent of the public "very 35 26 28 31 36 33 
interested" in news about 
other countries 
Percent of the public "very 50 44 45 49 53 50 
interested" in news about 
U.S. foreign relations with 
other countries 
Sources: The data for the first four entries in this table were taken from U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years and eclitions !Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office); data and questions for the last rwo entries are taken from john E. 
Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 !Chicago: Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, I995), figure I-I at p. 9. 
over, the foreign policy coverage was even smaller at about 2.6 percent/1 
and the foreign coverage by the major American networks and the num-
ber of foreign correspondents continues to decline as well.62 
Still, and importantly, the media seemingly have enlarged their abil-
ity to bring more and more dramatic international events into the 
homes of Americans. In this sense, by the decisions on what interna-
tional events the media shall report and how those events are covered, 
the media can affect the direction of foreign policy debate at home. 
The Locus of Decision Making and Interest Groups 
A final factor that has enhanced interest group and media access to the 
foreign policy process is the changing locus of decision making. Most 
foreign policy issues during the cold war were crisis issues-issues that 
required a quick, immediate response to meet some impending threat. 
Because those policies and decisions were largely decided within the ex-
ecutive branch, interest groups had limited access (and influence). While 
such security issues may still confront policy makers in the post-cold 
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war environment, their aggregate number seems to have declined, and 
the kinds of security issues have changed, as noted earlier. As a result, 
access for interest groups is likely to increase as decisions move toward 
those decisions that have been identified as strategic and structural in 
nature. 
Strategic policies are those that "specif[y] the goals and tactics of de-
fense and foreign policy." 63 Within this very broad category, decisions 
focusing on the policy guidelines for American actions toward a par-
ticular region (e.g., Southeast Asia), country (e.g., Russia), or issue (e.g., 
trade) would qualify as strategic policy. While the president has the ad-
vantage of recommending the basic policy direction in a given area, 
these strategic decisions are increasingly subject to review and evalua-
tion in Congress, especially when they do not require immediate action. 
As such, the locus of these decisions is shifting to the Congress or to a 
combined legislative-executive decision. As the time allowed for deci-
sion making increases and the locus of decision making moves toward 
the Congress, interest groups have more opportunities to convey their 
stances on the outcome. Indeed, as we shall note shortly, the Congress 
has often passed procedural legislation requiring congressional review 
of executive actions in a number of strategic areas, further expanding 
interest group access. 
Structural policies are even more ripe for interest group activity. 
These policies are directed at the details of actions in the foreign and 
defense areas. As Lindsay and Ripley note, these policies focus on "pro-
curing, deploying, and organizing military personnel and material ... 
[and] which countries will receive aid, what rules will govern immigra-
tion."64 Both by tradition and constitutional requirements, the ultimate 
locus of such decisions are in the Congress, not in the executive branch. 
In this policy area, as in the strategic policy area, interest groups have 
an ever larger role to play, owing to the locus of decisions in the con-
gressional arena and the greater frequencies of these decisions. 
Coupled with the changing nature of foreign policy issues is the 
growth in the procedural requirements placed upon the executive 
branch by the congressional branch. These procedural requirements, 
virtually by definition, require congressional involvement-an involve-
ment which allows the time and venue for interest groups to have more 
access and impact on foreign policy. Over the past two and a half de-
cades, several key areas of executive foreign policy have become sub-
ject for congressional review: the war-making area, the commitment-
making area, the trade and aid area, and the general oversight of foreign 
policy.65 
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Several illustrations will demonstrate this more direct involvement 
of Congress and identify the additional avenues for interest groups to 
play a part in the process. While the war-making and commitment-
making areas are less successful in enabling Congress to play a larger 
role (despite actions such as the passage of the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973 or the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972), the trade and aid areas and 
the oversight activities, by contrast, have seemingly been more conse-
quential for a congressional role and for interest group activity as well. 
These areas, too, epitomize the focus on important strategic and struc-
tural policy questions. 
First, since the Trade Act of 1974, Congress has actually written into 
law requirements that private groups advise the administration during 
any trade negotiations.66 This process has been accelerated even more 
in recent years with the use of the so-called fast-track procedures. At 
the negotiating stage of the process, for example, four types of advi-
sory committees from the private sector may participate: (1) a broadly 
based committee drawn from key sectors of the country; (2) a general 
advisory committee from industry, agriculture, labor, and other sectors; 
(3) sector or functional committees composed of those interests diiectly 
affected by any prospective agreement; and (4) policy advisory com-
mittees from state and local governments and their representatives.67 
Depending upon the particular representatives chosen and industries 
represented, some of the most important private sector companies and 
interests can have a direct and tangible impact on the negotiating pro-
cess. Once the negotiation process is completed, these committees and 
advisory panels may then submit their evaluations to the executive 
branch, the legislative branch, and the United States trade representa-
tive (usTR).68 Here, too, these groups could affect the outcome of the 
process. Finally, congressional committees must draw up the imple-
menting legislation for the negotiated agreement, allowing yet another 
avenue for interest group influence. 
Second, foreign economic and military assistance allows interest 
group access. Because arms sales legislation passed in the mid-1970s 
now requires both a report to, and a review by, the Congress of any 
proposed arms sales, foreign policy interest groups have a ready oppor-
tunity to mobilize and weigh in on the final disposition of any sales 
proposal. This review period lasts for fifty days from the time of the an-
nouncement of the arms sales (a thirty-day formal review period and a 
twenty-day informal review period) and affected interest groups could 
still have an opportunity to affect the final outcome. 
Third, congressional procedural changes have enhanced interest 
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group access in the area of oversight. Because an increasing number of 
issues are subject to the congressional review process and because these 
reviews generally involve structural and strategic policy questions, the 
sheer volume of activity, as noted earlier, advantages interest groups. 
Both the principal foreign policy committees !House International Rela-
tions and Senate Foreign Relations) have expanded the number of over-
sight hearings, with the House side particularly noted for the increased 
number of such activities. Similarly, the national security committees 
!House National Security and Senate Armed Services) have undertaken 
these kinds of oversight hearings as well, even as they also move into 
the area of devising strategy. Such ready forums allow outside interested 
parties to seek to influence the Congress, and, ultimately, policy. 
The Locus of Decision Making and Media Access 
The media also benefit from the change in the locus of foreign policy de-
cision making from crisis to structural/strategic issues and from the ex-
ecutive to the Congress. Structural and strategic issues are more likely 
to spark controversy, require expert analysis, take more time, and lack 
a readily identifiable policy consensus. For each of these reasons, media 
access and involvement will increase. 
First, since structural and strategic issues, almost by definition, have 
a greater prospect of being linked to domestic politics, they are likely to 
generate controversy-the lifeblood of the media. Issues on base clos-
ings, the building of new weaponry systems, the granting of trade con-
cessions, the reduction of tariffs, or the imposing of new environmental 
standards-all are likely to stimulate partisan and ideological differ-
ences at home. Such differences, too, are apt subjects for increased cov-
erage by the media on a regular basis. 
Second, structural and strategic issues often require policy "experts" 
and the exploration of viable policy options, further aiding the media. 
The appropriate means for disposing of surplus fissile materials from 
the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, for instance, requires those 
knowledgeable both technically and politically. The media thus can 
search out these experts for their reporting.jlnterestingly, too, these ex-
perts are likely to come from prominent interest groups.) Furthermore, 
with this kind of issue and with other current ones, such as the uses and 
abuses of foreign aid, human rights violations in China, or drug traffick-
ing from Latin America, investigative reports on these subjects by the 
media are appropriate and potentially useful. Furthermore, the media 
can play a large role with these investigations through ferreting out 
issues that others may try to concealjwitness the role of the media over 
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foreign campaign contributions in the 1996 presidential campaign). In 
this way, the media contribute to, and shape, the foreign policy agenda 
in a way they could not when crisis issues dominated the political land-
scape. 
Third, because structural and strategic issues involve more decision-
making time for policy makers, the media are advantaged as well. Much 
as with interest groups, the media can play a larger role, the more a de-
cision is extended over time. The expanded time allows the media to 
explore and report on the various aspects of the controversy and assess 
the impact of the controversy on the domestic arena. As the decision 
time expands, then, the various "players" on a given issue will be able to 
seek out the media to try to make their case with the American public. 
Fourth, these structural and strategic issues oftentimes do not en-
joy a readily identifiable policy position. The question of the expansion 
of NATO or the wisdom of expanding free trade areas is fraught with 
controversy. While the media may contribute to the debate over such 
questions with their investigative work or with the reliance on policy 
experts, those actions also fuel the debate and indirectly enhance the 
impact of the media. 
Finally, and as with the discussion of interest groups, the locus of 
decision making of these issues largely remains outside the exclusive 
purview and control of the executive branch. That is, Congress plays a 
role in deciding on both strategic and structural issues. In this way, ac-
cess is more assured for the media, and their involvement enlarged. 
Polley Influence: The Impact of Interest Groups and the Media 
With all these points of access, the issue that still remains is over 
the degree of interest group and media influence on foreign policy. 
While involvement and access may arguably be necessary conditions 
for policy influence, they are not sufficient ones. At the same time, 
with marked domestic and international changes, the prospects look 
seemingly bright for interest groups and the media to have a significant 
impact in the years ahead.69 In this sense, in the post-cold war era, we 
should likely see an increase in interest groups and media influence 
across a wider array of foreign policy issues. 
While confirmatory data on this assessment remain fragmentary, 
some selective analyses provide initial support for expanding interest 
group influence. The effect of foreign policy interest groups in the trade 
area, most recently over NAFTA and GATT, is well recognized. Indeed, 
in the case of the former, for example, lobbyists were actually asked to 
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"lend a hand" to get the pact through the Congress, and, in a reversal of 
the usual roles, an official of Office of the USTR attended the meetings of 
a business group supporting the pact?0 In the foreign aid area (e.g., in the 
case of Zaire or Israel}, the conclusion about interest group influence re-
mains the same. While certain conditions (such as the receptivity of the 
interest groups' target and the level of campaign funding to individual 
members of Congress} had to exist in the Zaire case, Congress still kept 
open the money spigot flowing to that regime, despite a dismal human 
rights record.71 Similarly, agricultural credits continued-and economic 
sanctions were postponed-toward Iraq, owing to the sustained lobby-
ing efforts of selected foreign policy interest groups.72 More recently, 
questions have been raised over the impact of foreign campaign con-
tributions to the Clinton administration's Asian policy. While official 
denials remain, the magnitude of the contributions and the level of sus-
tained activity by foreign groups leave lingering doubts. 
Despite these illustrative examples, though, significant barriers still 
hamper interest groups from working their will on foreign policy mak-
ers even as these groups are increasingly involved in the process. First, 
interest group effectiveness still probably requires the mobilization of a 
larger group or the public at large to have an immediate and sustained 
impact.73 Only in rare instances do foreign policy issues produce such an 
effect among the public. Second, the dispersal of more and more interest 
groups involved in the decision process has the effect of reducing the in-
fluence of any one group. What matters as a result is the relative power 
and capabilities of particular groups in the political arena, not the sheer 
number of political actors. In this sense, there is hardly a linear relation-
ship between the growth in interest group activity and their policy im-
pact. Indeed, the relationship might actually be curvilinear, with issues 
generating few interest groups or those generating many interest groups 
producing limited policy impact in both instances, albeit for differing 
reasons: A small number of groups does not have sufficient clout, while 
a large number of competing groups cancel out one another's influence. 
Third, the complexity of the American political system, coupled with 
the continued (albeit weakened} presidential discretion on foreign pol-
icy questions, works against interest groups gaining their will in the 
foreign policy process. The usual judgment that interest groups can be 
more effective in stopping action than in changing directions remains 
as accurate in the foreign policy arena as it does in the domestic arena.74 
Yet the ability of these groups to initiate changes in policy likely will 
remain a problem in the post- cold war era as much as it was in the 
cold war environment. Despite the magnitude of lobbying on both sides 
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of this issue, Arnson and Brenner still felt compelled to conclude that 
"interest groups may have had a limited impact on the direction of U.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s because of the limited scope and 
opportunities for influence offered to them by the Congress." 75 
Fourth, new lobbyist registration laws and incipient campaign 
finance reform efforts do not bode well for either domestic or foreign 
policy interest groups. Under the new lobbying bill passed in late 1995, 
lobbying by lawyers for foreign interests is not exempt, and lobbying 
lawyers must now register with the House and the Senate. Lobbyists 
must now report on the names of their clients, the issues that they are 
working, and what part of the federal government that they have tried 
to lobby. In addition, these lobbyists must also provide an estimate of 
the income derived from each lobbying activity.76 Furthermore, if cam-
paign reform were to become a reality in the wake of the 1996 presiden-
tial campaign scandal, restrictions on campaign contributions, arguably 
the most important avenues of access and influence for interest groups, 
would likely be incorporated. In this sense, interest groups, including 
the foreign lobbyists, will have a difficult time impacting the process. 
Confident conclusions about the media's influence, however, are 
more difficult to make. While the media have expanded their access and 
involvement, their influence remains hotly debated. While the sheer 
magnitude of the media coverage appears greater across a host of issues, 
and conditions exist for greater influence, analysts remain divided. 
Some analysts still see the media as largely a captive of official adminis-
tration policy. In this sense, the media never veer too far from the offi-
cial policy line of the administration in its reporting on foreign policy. 
When they do, they do so because "the sphere of legitimate contro-
versy" has been expanded by officials themselves. Thus, the notion of 
an "oppositional media" since the Vietnam War is hard to sustain.77 In 
short, the media remain largely supportive of official policy or at least 
followers of the lead provided by policy makers.78 
Other analysts see the emergence of an increasingly independent role 
for the media in influencing policy. The media can work to set the for-
eign agenda through the stories that they report (e.g., famine in Ethiopia 
and Somalia) or even engage in what Doris Graber labels "media diplo-
macy." That is, members of the media become part of the foreign policy 
event (e.g., the role of CBS newsman Walter Cronkite in bringing Israeli 
prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat 
together, which resulted in Sadat's visit to Israel).79 Furthermore, there 
remains the view among the public that the media possess a liberal bias 
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in their reporting and try to influence the public and policy makers 
with those views.80 
Finally, a more recent argument about the influence of the media 
charts a middle position among these differing views of the media's in-
fluence . Patrick O'Heffernan contends that the media and the govern-
ment have a "mutually exploitative" relationship with one another.81 As 
Heffernan argues, "[B]oth [the foreign policy community and the media] 
are adept at supporting, manipulating, or attacking the other. The rela-
tionship is sometimes competitive and sometimes cooperative, but that 
is only incidental to its central driving force: self-interest." 82 Increas-
ingly, then, policy makers and the media view one another as part of 
the foreign policy process, and, as a result, each influences the other.83 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to look at a series of factors that seem to chal-
lenge the traditional view regarding the influence of interest groups and 
the media in the foreign policy, especially as we enter the post-cold war 
era. Although many of the arguments have been raised by others, they 
have not received the kind of treatment in the American foreign policy 
literature that they deserve. Perhaps it is best to close this discussion on 
these concerns with a plea for more systematic work on these two sub-
jects in combination and for greater assessment of how one impacts the 
other and, in turn, affects the foreign policy process. There has been, 
for example, a renaissance in the study of American foreign policy and 
public opinion in the past decade, but it has not been matched by a simi-
lar rebirth in the study of interest groups and their effects on foreign 
policy. By contrast, the efforts to study the role and impact of the media 
is largely in its embryonic stage. As a result, we remain left with much 
of the conventional wisdom about interest groups, media, and foreign 
policy-a wisdom that may not be very conventional for the post-cold 
war world. 
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